01:10 09-06-2004
Having changed the combat plan accordingly, the counterattack was now launched at about 2100, (line of departure time). In spite of the extremely strong enemy artillery fire, our forces advanced toward Eterville ard those operating in the area between Eterville and height 112, made good progress. Eterville was recaptured toward 0100. However, it was impossible to get near height 112 because of the concentrated artillery fire maintained for hours by all the enemy's heavy weapons. It was not until daybreak that the wooded strip of land- in other words, the southern edge of the plateau on this height could be taken. Thus the gap torn open in the MLR on the preceding day had been closed again and the mission assigned to the Division accomplished. Height 112 was no longer defended in the same way as before, i.e. on the northern edge of the plateau; the Division ordered the construction of a new main line of resistance in the southern part of the plateau, near the northern edge of the wooded strip of land, continuing toward the west, a line which was not visible to the enemy.
In the course of the forenoon the enemy, in turn, resumed his attacks and managed to take Eterville once again, whereas his attacks on height 112 were repelled with considerable losses. A counterattack launched immediately on Eterville succeeded and, by noon, the village was again in our hands. An extremely heavy and fluctuating battle ensued aftenwards for the ruins of Eterville, which place changed hands repeatedly until, finally, it was firmly in our possession late in the evening of 4 July 1944. The losses suffered during these engagements in the rocky terrain offering almost no cover, were considerable (Grenadiers about 10%), and mainly caused, of course, by the excessively strong artillery fire, which could be countered by next to nothing from our side, since only some 700 rounds of ammunition were available for the entire attack on 4 July. Nevertheless, the Pz Bn operating near Eterville managed to destroy 12-14 enemy vehicles, whereas they lost only 2 tanks. Thus, it could be figured out that the enemy losses were at least as high as ours.
The complete difference between the Eastern and the Western Theaters, became evident already during the first commitment of the Division. While on the Eastern Front, numbers were always the decisive element in an attack, the Allied infantry on the Western Front restricted itself to the execution of swift and short thrusts after heavy use of air, artillery, and armored forces. This employment of supporting weapons with unprecedented expenditure of ammunition was according to our conceptions up to that time, out of all proportion to the terrain gained, which, in spite of all, was often recaptured right afterwards in a counterthrust or counterattack. On the other hand, of course, this manner of fighting reduced the enemy losses of manpower to a minimum, whereas on our side, even the best-trained and best-equipped division was gradually battered down in the long run owing to the shortage of armunition. If the enemy had only had the same amount of arrmunition, he would, incidentally, not have achieved this success either.
During the following night of 4/5 July 1944, the Division was relieved on the eastern sector by elements of the 12 SS Pz Div and on the western sector by the 10 SS Pz Div. Thereupon, the divisional forces were reassembled for the same purpose and in almost the same area as on 3 July. They were also assigned the additional task of constructing prepared positions in the rear in the line along the course of the stream and along the heights south of it, and occupying the line with weak forces. The Pz Pion Bn (armored engineer battalion) was put in charge of the construction of this position. In addition, from each SS Pz Gre Rgt, one Grenadier battalion was used for the task. the Artillery Rgt was ordered to move into such a position that all important points before the entire corps sector could be covered by concentrated fire. All other units were to repair weapons and equipment with all available means, and give their men a good rest.
On 6 July, the enemy resumed his attacks, this time along the road running from Caen to Noyers. To meet this attack, the Division had to assign the PzA.A. (armored reconnaissance battalion) to the 277 Inf Div. The Battalion managed to recapture Noyers in a counterattack and, for the time being, remained with the 277 Infantry Division.
Early in the morning of 7 July 1944, the enemy opened an attack on Gavrus and Bougny. Both localities were lost. An immediate counterattack by the Fusilier Battalion of the 277 Inf Div was brought to a standstill in the wooded area just south of Bougy, with heavy losses. The Division had no other forces at its disposal. Thereupon, 9 SS Panter Div was alerted and ordered to recapture the villages of Gavrus and Bougy and restore the previous main line of resistance. The Division assigned the 19 SS Pz Gre Rgt the task of retaking Rougy, by way of Locheur, along the course of the stream, in order to reoccupy Garvus afterwards, using the same route. This attack was supported by an armored battalion (of about 15-20 vehicles) and by the Artillery Rgt which, however, had at the upmost some 600 rounds of armmunition left. Also the corps artillery was ordered to support the action by some sudden concentrations of fire.
After hasty assembly, the counterattack was launched around 1100 and at about 1400, Bougy was again in our hands. One hour later, Garvus was also recaptured despite the enemy artillery, which unremittingly pounded both villages and the woods around them. This inflicted high losses on the 19 SS PzGre Rgt, approximately 15%, and, of course, especially on the battalion fighting in and around Garvus. In the evening, the British again attacked the Garvus at about 1900 and- after having disabled several of our armored cars, although without putting them out of action, managed to throw our elements out of the village. An immediate counterattack from Bougy was repelled by the enemy who, almost undisturbed by the German forces owing to their lack of amnunition, continously moved up reinforcements from the woods north of Garvus.
Current music: Theatre of Tragedy - Siren 
In the course of the forenoon the enemy, in turn, resumed his attacks and managed to take Eterville once again, whereas his attacks on height 112 were repelled with considerable losses. A counterattack launched immediately on Eterville succeeded and, by noon, the village was again in our hands. An extremely heavy and fluctuating battle ensued aftenwards for the ruins of Eterville, which place changed hands repeatedly until, finally, it was firmly in our possession late in the evening of 4 July 1944. The losses suffered during these engagements in the rocky terrain offering almost no cover, were considerable (Grenadiers about 10%), and mainly caused, of course, by the excessively strong artillery fire, which could be countered by next to nothing from our side, since only some 700 rounds of ammunition were available for the entire attack on 4 July. Nevertheless, the Pz Bn operating near Eterville managed to destroy 12-14 enemy vehicles, whereas they lost only 2 tanks. Thus, it could be figured out that the enemy losses were at least as high as ours.
The complete difference between the Eastern and the Western Theaters, became evident already during the first commitment of the Division. While on the Eastern Front, numbers were always the decisive element in an attack, the Allied infantry on the Western Front restricted itself to the execution of swift and short thrusts after heavy use of air, artillery, and armored forces. This employment of supporting weapons with unprecedented expenditure of ammunition was according to our conceptions up to that time, out of all proportion to the terrain gained, which, in spite of all, was often recaptured right afterwards in a counterthrust or counterattack. On the other hand, of course, this manner of fighting reduced the enemy losses of manpower to a minimum, whereas on our side, even the best-trained and best-equipped division was gradually battered down in the long run owing to the shortage of armunition. If the enemy had only had the same amount of arrmunition, he would, incidentally, not have achieved this success either.
During the following night of 4/5 July 1944, the Division was relieved on the eastern sector by elements of the 12 SS Pz Div and on the western sector by the 10 SS Pz Div. Thereupon, the divisional forces were reassembled for the same purpose and in almost the same area as on 3 July. They were also assigned the additional task of constructing prepared positions in the rear in the line along the course of the stream and along the heights south of it, and occupying the line with weak forces. The Pz Pion Bn (armored engineer battalion) was put in charge of the construction of this position. In addition, from each SS Pz Gre Rgt, one Grenadier battalion was used for the task. the Artillery Rgt was ordered to move into such a position that all important points before the entire corps sector could be covered by concentrated fire. All other units were to repair weapons and equipment with all available means, and give their men a good rest.
On 6 July, the enemy resumed his attacks, this time along the road running from Caen to Noyers. To meet this attack, the Division had to assign the PzA.A. (armored reconnaissance battalion) to the 277 Inf Div. The Battalion managed to recapture Noyers in a counterattack and, for the time being, remained with the 277 Infantry Division.
Early in the morning of 7 July 1944, the enemy opened an attack on Gavrus and Bougny. Both localities were lost. An immediate counterattack by the Fusilier Battalion of the 277 Inf Div was brought to a standstill in the wooded area just south of Bougy, with heavy losses. The Division had no other forces at its disposal. Thereupon, 9 SS Panter Div was alerted and ordered to recapture the villages of Gavrus and Bougy and restore the previous main line of resistance. The Division assigned the 19 SS Pz Gre Rgt the task of retaking Rougy, by way of Locheur, along the course of the stream, in order to reoccupy Garvus afterwards, using the same route. This attack was supported by an armored battalion (of about 15-20 vehicles) and by the Artillery Rgt which, however, had at the upmost some 600 rounds of armmunition left. Also the corps artillery was ordered to support the action by some sudden concentrations of fire.
After hasty assembly, the counterattack was launched around 1100 and at about 1400, Bougy was again in our hands. One hour later, Garvus was also recaptured despite the enemy artillery, which unremittingly pounded both villages and the woods around them. This inflicted high losses on the 19 SS PzGre Rgt, approximately 15%, and, of course, especially on the battalion fighting in and around Garvus. In the evening, the British again attacked the Garvus at about 1900 and- after having disabled several of our armored cars, although without putting them out of action, managed to throw our elements out of the village. An immediate counterattack from Bougy was repelled by the enemy who, almost undisturbed by the German forces owing to their lack of amnunition, continously moved up reinforcements from the woods north of Garvus.
Current music: Theatre of Tragedy - Siren
отредактировано: 09-06-2004 01:18 - Kraut
