III. The employment of the Division for Defense

Once the enemy had also reached the area west of the Odon, thus pushing into the flank of the attacking 19 SS Pz Gre Rgt, any further fighting for Garvus became entirely meaningless for the time being. With the approval of the Corps, the Division therefore ordered the construction of a new main line of resistance along the wooded strip of land north of Bougy in a terrain relatively favorable for the purpose. In spite of all the efforts made by the brave Grenadiers, and the men from the armored units, they could not manage to completely restore the old main line of resistance. Moreover, the Division, already badly reduced on the Eastern Front, had lost almost 1/3 of its fighting strength during the last three counterattacks.

It is easy to figure out how long a unit can hold out in such extremely severe conditions of fighting. Besides, it was absolutely clear that the infantry divisions of the Corps committed to the main line of resistance, were neither adequately equipped nor sufficiently trained for the purpose of warding off enemy tank attacks. This would have resulted in further counterattacks of the 9th SS Pz Div, which would have been at least as costly as the previous ones, and the execution of which would have been more difficult on account of the continuous lack of ammunition for all heavy arms and the artillery.

Moreover, to cope with the difficult situations after enemy penetrations, the counterattacks always had to be launched in great hurry and often without the necessary preparations and without moving the forces into assembly positions. Therefore, it was suggested that the Division no longer be committed as tactical reserve, but used for defense, although this did not exactly come up to the combat principles of an armored division. The corps approved the suggestion and on 8 or 9 July 1944, the Division took over the sector Height 112 -- Odon. Elements of the 277 Inf Div committed up to that time on that sector, remained in the main line of resistance and were subordinated to the 9th SS Pz Div. As to the course of the main line of resistance and the commitment of the troops, the main battle line ran from Height 112 (southeast of Caen) and by the Odon River to just west of Noyes.

During the following days, the enemy tried time and again to attack Height 112, or Height 113 or in the dip between these heights, or towards Bougy in order to effect a breakthrough by way of Evrecy. This was confirmed by written orders found in abandoned British tanks. By good luck -- or perhaps owing to his heavy losses -- the enemy did not resume his attacks on the following day. Now all men available, including those of all supply troops were set to digging trenches. Thus, the Division had the opportunity of consolidating its positions, if only in a makeshift way, as the terrain was completely rocky, making it almost impossible to work with normal entrenching tools. therefore, it was necesary to bring up heavy entrenching tools from the supply dumps far behind the front or from the O.T. units (Todt organization). Night after night, the Pioneer Bn was busy blasting combat posts, dugouts, and communications trenches out of the rocks, and laying mine fields of all sorts in front of certain points of the sector which were particularly endangered. Later the enemy resumed his attacks on the above mentioned objectives, our troops managed to repulse all of them, all though the enemy rose to three or even four attacks on certain days.

With every attack repelled, the confidence of the troops grew stronger, whereas the enemy's aggressive spirit seemed to decrease more and more. Although his attacks were always preceded by heavily massed artillery barrages lasting for hours, his tanks and infantrymen advanced only hesitatingly and very carefully and having suffered some casualties or losses, immediately turned around to have the artillery go into action again. Tne latter then even increased its intensity of fire, if a further intensification was at all possible. During those days, the enemy artillery fire reached such a pitch that veterans of the First World War unanimously agree, it surpassed even the fire in the trenches during the tremendous battles of materiel during that war.

Nevertheless, the majority of the men, with the exception of the very young, inexperienced ones, somehow got used to this fact, be it by callousness toward the permanent danger of death, by indifference or by the constant repetition in the pattern of the enemy artillery fire. It must be emphasized that it did, however, have a tremendous effect on the morale of all troops. Everybody almost automatically went by the fact that during certain periods, such as, 0700-0900, 1300-1500, and at night from about 0200 till about 0400, the enemy ceased firing, unless he planned to launch an attack during one of these periods. In a similar way, every messenger, supply or ammunition driver knew exactly at what time he could safely pass through a village or cross a road junction, since these targets were regularly fired upon in a certain order of succession. It was even possible to distinguish the particular artillery regiments, because as a rule whole regiments concentrated its fire on such targets (making it possible to ascertain which of the enemy's previously located artillery regiments were doing the firing).



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